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The Law of Real Property and Other Interests in Land. By Herbert Thorn-
dike Tiffany. Second Edition. Chicago, Callaghan and Co., i92o. In
Three Volumes. Vol. I, pp. xxxii, 1-1196; Vol.. II, pp. xiv, 1197-2272; Vol.
III, pp. ix, 2273-3666.
To say that this work, which the cover label asserts to be a second edition, is
a notable improvement upon the earlier work is not to disparage a treatise which
ever since its -publication in i9o3 has been held in high esteem by scholars as well
as by the profession generally, but to praise highly the new edition. The
profession has become all too familiar with new editions of successful law books
published primarily to provide artificial stimulus to a failing market. Added-
and expensive-bulk is given to such new editions by shoveling large heaps of
digest paragraphs into the text and even larger piles of misfit case citations into
the notes. Such meretricious methods Mr. Tiffany eschews. The title page
speaks more truly than the cover-label when it calls the new publication an
"enlarged edition." For it is enlarged in every dimension, corporeally and
incorporeally. In the making of many books, which is more obviously without
end nowadays than in the time when the Wise Man of Israel first made his
unscholarly lament, corporeal things are not to be despised. Here we have
well-bound volumes, printed on good thin paper, in beautifully clear type, both
in text and fbotnotes. They are gentlemanly looking books, such as one likes
to associate with. Of course the experienced lawyer should not expect even
the fairest ointment to be without its fly, not even in this glad day when he
finds in his hands a book well printed despite the prevalence of cost conditions
that ought to be void for impossibility, and well written despite the mighty
digests. Here the misplaced insect which impairs our joy is incredibly bad
proof-reading. Not only are citations in the notes frequently incorrect, but
even in the text confusing misprints occur. The type for one paragraph (p.
2186) evidently got itself scattered over the floor and was re-assembled by the
office boy according to his own theory as to the law of wild titles. The result
is quite astounding.
Another matter of corporeal interest is the title of the new work-or, perhaps,
one should say quasi-corporeal interest, since it affects psychic relations as well
as those merely physical. The title of the first edition, "The Modern Law of
Real Property," was offensive. It suggested buncombe. One could as sensibly
and truly speak of twentieth century constitutional law, or publish a working plan
for a skyscraper that ignored the foundation and first score or so of stories.
The new edition is entitled "The Law of Real Property," and admirably treats
of historic originals. Another change in form which the reader welcomes is the
absence of the black letter head notes found in the first edition. Such general-
izations, frequently misleading in their inadequacy, gave an impression of
superficiality which slandered the excellent quality of the text.
Turning from form to content, one notes that the three volumes of the present
work, containing more than three times as much printed matter as the two
volumes of the first edition, constitute in effect a new treatise. While the original
analysis and arrangement of topics has been retained with little change, most of
the sections have been rewritten and greatly expanded, covering the topics far
more completely, and with much more copious citation of supporting authorities,
selected with remarkable care and discrimination from the great body of case
law, including the most recent decisions, and from the great classic treatises on
the law of Property, including the writings of that distinguished scholar, the late
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Professor John Chipman Gray, whose influence is stamped deeply upon all of
Mr. Tiffany's work. Even those relatively few sections that remain substantially
unchanged show* modifications in phraseology carefully made in the interest
of greater accuracy and clearness. The carefulness of the revision is shown by
instances in which portions of the text have been lowered to the footnotes,
and others in which notes have been incorporated in the text.
Perhaps the most striking contribution which the author has made to the
art of text-book writing is found in his thorough and successful use of special
articles and editorial notes published in the various American legal periodicals
and in the English Law Quarterly Review. The frequent citation of these
articles has worked a double good. Not only does it make available what is
now become a very considerable body of valuable legal literature, too little known
to the bench and bar, but it has also stimulated the author to exercise marked
independence in weighing authorities and testing judicial conclusions, and to
state the results of the process with a vigor quite unusual in modern law books,
which are apt to be little more than confused echoes of discordant head notes.
Thus the author has incorporated bodily (pp. 1762-1788) his own excellent article
on The Conditional Delivery of Deeds, published in (1914) 14 COL. L. REv., a most
agreeable substitute for the pale comments on this topic found in the first edition.
His excellent discussion of future interests in personalty, which could scarcely
be improved within its scope, unmistakably reflects the article by Professol Gray
in (igoi) 14 HARv. L. REv. 397 [republished as Appendix F in te Third Edition
(1914) of Gray's Rule against Perpetuities], of which full acknowledgment is
made. An even more striking example of the influence of such periodical litera-
ture upon the author's work is found in his wholly rewritten treatment of
"Licenses" (pp. 12o1-1223) in which he adopts the terminology, analysis and
conclusions of the late Professor Hohfeld's masterly article-entitled. Faulty
Analysis in Easement and License Cases in (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 66.
At other places he refers with warm approval to Professor Hohfeld's now
famous articles on Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning (1913) 23 YALE LAw JOURNAL, I6, and (1917) 26 id. 71o, but aside
from the treatment of Licenses, referred to above, there is little evidence that
Hohfeld's writings have materially influenced the author's work. Thus, for
example, he says (p. io41) : "A power over land may be defined as a right or
ability in a person to create an estate or interest in the land, or to impose a
lien thereon," with. seeming indifference to the fact that no one of the five terms
right, ability, interest, estate and lien as here used to define the term power, has
any definite or fixed meaning.- Here the reader is left uncertain not only As to
the concepts intended to be expressed by these words, but also as to whether
the paired terms "right or ability" and "estate or interest," are used by the author
as synonymous or as mutually exclusive, though he will probably draw the
doubtful inference that a lien on land is neither an estate nor an interest therein.
So the author, to designate a special topic under the general heading, "Rights
as to the Use and Profits of Another's Land," still retains the unfortunate
expression "Natural Rights." The most important question really considered
under this topic is the extent of the privilege of the landowner to make use of
the air and water over, upon, and under his land, or to dig in that land, and his
duty not to exceed that privilege so as injuriously to affect his neighbor. It
is true the latter has the correlative right that the land owner shall not exceed
his privilege and thus unreasonably interfere with the usual flow of air and water
to his land, but this can- hardly be accurately termed a right in another's land.
So far as such rights may be attached to any land, it is to the land of the
claimant rather than to that of another; and certainly such rights- are no more
natural than any other rights enjoyed in connection with physical objects.
Professor Bigelow, in his casebook on Rights in Land (I919), uses the happier
title "Rights Incidental to Possession."
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However, it is to be noted that the critical comments here made go rather
to the general desirability of a revised analysis of the law of property and the
adoption of a more exact terminology that will make possible the more accurate
statement of its rules and principles, than t6"the relative merits of Mr. Tiffany's
excellent treatise. His analysis has the merit of being in accord, for the most
part, with familiar usage, and in using confusedly terms of uncertain meaning,
he is speaking the language of the great masters of the literature of the law of
property, and of the courts. Despite minor criticisms that might be made, we
may say of this work that in the balanced completeness of its treatment of a
vast subject, in its critical and discriminating use of authorities, and in the
simplicity and clearness of its style, it stands out as a notable achievement of
sound scholarship, one of the very few great American lawbooks.
W. R. VANCE
Yale University, School of Law.
The Constitution and What it Means Today. By Edward S. Corwin. Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 192o. pp. xxiv, 114.
This little handbook is meant to explain to the non-technlical reader the
actual meaning of the United States Constitution today. That this cannot really
be done in so small a compass, even for the purpose of a layman, is tolerably
clear, and much less can or does the book carry out the liberal promise on its
cover page . . . "with full explanations of all passages which seem the least
obscure." Perhaps Professor Corwin has done as well as anyone could in the
same number of words. Some of his brief commentaries are excellent, though
there is also a considerable number of inaccuracies and infelicities of statement.
It might be thought that a discussion for laymen would be more readily compre-
hended if related parts of the Constitution were considered together, instead of
all clauses being taken up in the order in which they occur in the instrument.
Perhaps the gain in ease of reference offsets this, however.
J. P. HALL
University of Chicago Law School.
The Law of Contracts, Volumes II, III and IV. By Samuel Williston. New
York, Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1920. Vol. II, pp. xxi, 1157-2329; Vol. III, pp.
xxii,*2331-3456; Vol. IV, 3457-4182.
The first volume of this set has already been reviewed at length. See (1920)
29 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 942. Volume .I deals with "Performance of Contracts,"
including Interpretation, Construction, and Express and Implied Conditions;
and also with "Particular Classes of Contracts," including Sales, Service, Bail-
ments, Carriers, Negotiable Instruments, and Suretyship. Volume III deals with
"Remedies for Breach of Contract;" Fraud, Duress, Mistake, and Illegality;
and "Discharge of Contracts." Volume IV contains only the index and table
of cases.
No doubt the author does not purport to deal with every phase of such
particular classes of contracts as Sales, Carriers, and Negotiable Instruments.
However, he cannot avoid treating them to some extent; because the law of
contracts is but the complex aggregate of the law of the particular classes. The
Negotiable Instruments Law is printed in full with rather meagre comment. The
chapters on Suretyship are most excellent, and form the best existing text to go
with Ames' Cases on Suretyship.
Those who are familiar with Williston's Cases on Contracts know the extent
to which he improved upon Langdell in dealing with the subject of Construction
YALE LAW JOURNAL
and Performance of Contracts. No other writer has equalled Professor Willis-
ton's treatment of that subject in the present treatise. The most difficult
questions of contract law that confront the lawyer to-day are in this field.
He should not fail to go to this text for its discussion of conditions express
and implied, precedent and subsequent. When are promises mutually depen-
dent? What are the doctrines of "substantial" performance? What is the
"essence" of a contract and When is performance on time of the essence?, What
are the rules applicable to instalment contracts? These questions are exhaus-
tively answered.
Along with such thorough approval of the entire work, however, one may
perhaps be permitted to express a few. differences of opinion. In section 663 it
is said: "A condition in a promise limits the undertaking of the promisor to
perform, either by confining the undertaking to the case where the condition
happens or to the case where it does not happen." Here is a double use of the
term "condition;" for how can a condition be "in a promise" if it has not
happened or if it never happens? In the promissory expression there are words
that cause the subsequent event to operate as a condition. It is the event that is
the condition.
In section 665 the author very properly distinguishes between a promise and a
condition. Is it not doubtful, therefore, Whether he should use such a phrase
as "breach of a condition" or should speak of an "excuse for the non-perfor-
mance of a condition?" One would like a little clearer explanation of how
conditions "qualify not the existence of the contract but the liability under it."
How does a contract "exist," what is "liability," and how can either of them be
"qualified."
Is it not merely confusing to suggest, as in section 8og, of a condition subse-
quent: "Such a condition, however, though a true condition subsequent so far
as concerns a right of action on the promise may, it seems, be made by the
contract a condition precedent of a particular suit?" The author suggests that
the parties may provide "that it is a necessary prerequisite of any action
which may be brought that it shall be brought within a given time.' But how
can the bringing of a suit be a prerequisite to itself? The action is always
brought for the vindication of a pre-existing right. The. right, therefore, is a
prerequisitd to a just. judgment for the plaintiff. The suit should fail if any
condition precedent to the right has not occurred or if any condition subsequent
to the right .has occurred to extinguish it. It is the right, not the suit, that
depends upon the conditions, precedent or subsequent.
-Why does the author insist, as in section 84o, that a sealed instrument (or a
negotiiable instrument) and a separate written promise given in return must nec-
essarily be "separate contracts?" Our courts have long held, with Professor
Williston's approval, that such separate promises may be mutually dependent and
that the duty of each party may be conditional upon a performance by the other.
Nevertheless he writes that "The impossibility of suing at common law on such
a hybrid either in covenant or assumpsit is of itself enough to prove" that there
are two separate contracts. It is submitted that this is error. The two forms of
action mentioned have long been buried, as Maitland has said; and in this
instance they no longer rule us from their graves. The ancient forms of
action were indeed inadequate to do justice according to the modern notions of
what justice is. That is why we have buried them. The "civil action" under
our codes of to-day does not isolate some one fact, such as a seal, and give it a
legal operation to the neglect of other facts. Nor are there now two sets of
courts that will do conflicting and inconsistent things on the same facts. To-day
neither of the separate instruments can properly be called " a contract.' And the
legal relations between the parties cannot be determined by considering either
instrument alone. If by "contract" we mean the operative facts, we must include
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some of the physical acts of both parties and both paper documents. If we
mean the legal relations created by the facts, we mean the single set of legal
relations that are determined and created by all the existing facts. If. we mean
the "promise or set of promises," we must include the two promises as made.
For the "hybrid" contract we now have a "hybrid" action in a "hybrid" court.
That the parents belonged to different -species does not prevent the hybrid
progeny from having a single individuality of its own, with perhaps the good
qualities of each parent and the bad qualities of neither.
The accuracy of the foregoing does not in the least depend upon rules as to
burden of proof or burden of allegation or burden of going forward with
evidence. True legal relations are not determined by those rules.
In section 632, dealing with the parol evidence rule [and quoting Wigmore,
Evidence (igo5) sec. 24oi], it would 'be an improvement to follow Austin,
Holmes, and Markby in their definition of the word "act." Reasonable objec-
tion can be made to the following: the "creation of an act;" "a legal act
consisting of a promise or set of promises ;" "the written memorial . . is,
for legal purposes, the sole act of the parties."
Any reviewer can find specific flaws in any book. There is no one, however,
who is better prepared to write a complete work on the law of contracts than
Professor Williston; and there is no one who has as yet written so sound and
scholarly a treatise. Student, lawyer, or judge will alike be in serious error
unless he makes thoroughly his own the reasoning and system of Professor
Williston and uses them as the basis for further advance.
ARTHUR L. COPBIN.
Yale University, School of Law.
Collected Legal Papers. By Oliver Wendell Holmes. New York, Harcourt,
Brace & Howe, 1920. pp. vii, 316.
The thanks of the legal profession are due to Mr. Harold J. Laski for gathering
together in one volume these papers by Mr. Justice Holmes, for they contain,
even more than the learned author's work on The Common Law, an important
message which has not as yet been brought to the attention of the average lawyer
or judge. Scattered through the pages of the legal magazines, they have been
buried away where only few members of the bench and bar ever saw them and
so have failed to have their full effect upon legal thinking.
In tfie three essays entitled -"Privilege, Malice, and Intent" (1894), "The Path
of the Law" (1897) and "Law in Science and Science in Law' (1899) are
presented the fundamentals of Mr. Justice Holmes's methods of thought. To
"become a master" of the law, we are there told,
"means to look straight through all the dramatic incidents and to discern the
true basis for prophecy."'
"The means of doing that are, in the first place, to follow the existing body
of dogma into its highest generalizations by -the help of jurisprudence; next, 
to
discern from history how it has come to be what it is; and finally, so far as
you can, to consider the ends which the several rules seek to accomplish, 
the
reason why those ends are desired, what is given up to gain them, and whether
they are worth the price."
'
In his tribute to the learned author in the March number of the Harvard Law
Review for the current year, Dean Pound suggests that these methods and ideas
are characteristic of the legal thinking of the present. So far as a relatively
small number of legal scholars are concerned this is perhaps true, but it 
is
"The Path of the Law," I96.
'Id. I98.
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feared that the same statement will not hold for the vast majority of the
leaders of- the bench and bar, not to speak of the average lawyer. Even if we
confine our attention to law teachers, we find only a relatively, small number
*who exhibit any real appreciation of the message contained in these essays.
How many, for example, even among law teachers, not to mention judges and
practicing lawyers, "follow the exisfing body of dogma into its highest generali-
zations by the help of jurisprudence?" How many in any really adequate way"consider the ends which the several rules seek to accomplish, the reasons
why those ends are desired, what is given up to gain them, and whether they are
worth the price?" Consider, for example, the fact that the attempts of men like
Terry,3 Salmond,' and Hohfeld5 to isolate the different meanings of that vague
term "a right," and thereby to bring about clearer thinking and a more accurate
use of judicial precedent, have either passed unnoticed by members of the legal
profession or else have been rejected as something academic and useless. Is it
not clear that much missionary work remains to be done before the methods
of legal thinking exemplified in these papers become characteristic of a majority
of even the leaders of the legal profession? For this reason the present reviewer
is profoundly grateful that these essays have at last been made readily accessible.
It is to be hoped that such essays as "The Path of the Law" and "Law in
Science and Science in Law" will now be made a part of the required reading
of law students in every law school in the land.
WALTER WHEELER COOK
Columbia University Law School.
Comparative Administrative Law with special reference to the organization and
legal position of the administrative authorities in British India. By Nagen-
dranath Ghose. [Tagore Law Lectures, ig9S] Calcutta, Butterworth & Co.,
1919. pp. xliv, 704.
That the best book which has so far appeared in the English language on the
subject of comparative administrative law comes from India need not be sur-
prising. The difficulties in the production of such a book in other countries
under the Anglo-American system have heretofore been due to the fact that
there was supposed to be no such department in our law. Dicey had effectively
contrasted the Anglo-Amer.ican rule of law with the continental system of
Droit Administratif. In this country Professor Goodnow in the early 'go's
turned his attention to the branches of our law that corresponded in their
function with the administrative law of Europe. In the main, he found paral-
lels in our law regulating officers, particularly in that part of it which was
enmeshed in the rules of such extraordinary procedure as mandamus, certiorari,
and prohibition. But by far the most important part of this study was con-
nected at the time he wrote with the drawing of the outer boundaries of
.administrative law by reference to the due process clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Although this clause may not necessarily differ in
its meaning and applications from the expression "law of the land" in Magna
Carta, iih its actual application in this country, by reason of the nature of our
constitutional doctrine, it has led to a more rigid set of rules on the subject
of procedure before administrative bodies than anything known in England.
Consequently, while a very useful and interesting body of law has been found
teachable under the general caption "administrative law," and while this has been
'Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law (1884).
'Jurisprudcnce (ist ed., 1902).
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1913)
.23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 16.
BOOK REVIEWS 777
done under the stimulus of comparative jurisprudence, there has not developed
in America a body of law comparable to Droit Adininistratif.
In India, on the other hand, the government itself has grown out of a form 
of
administration. Accordingly, as the author justly remarks,
"constructive statesmanship has had greater play in determining the form and
spirit of the Indian administration than it had in the evolution of the Eriglish
and the French. . . . The way in which [British] rule was inaugurated 
in
India was certainly far from favorable to the development of administration
according to law. . . . Fortunately for India, however, the East India Com-
pany depended for its legal existence upon politically renewable charters of
the British Parliament, and the way in which the Parliament viewed the acquisi-
tion of political power by subjects of the Crown was well expressed.by the
elder Pitt when he declared from his place in Parliament that no subjects could
acquire sovereignty of any territory for themselves but only for the nation to
which they belonged."
In one sense, therefore, the coming of British law into India was accomplished
through administration. The author of the book, however, does not imagine
that the Indian system is perfect. In fact, the entire first part of the book which
traces the history of the administrative systems of ancient and mediaeval
peoples, is devoted to a thesis that the development of a reconcilation between
administration and law is of very slow and recent growth, and that even now
it is far from having' reached its culmination.
The body of the book is divided into substantive and adjective administrative
law. Of the former, the major part is taken up by a discussion of the organiza-
tion of the administrative. This part is -perhaps the least interesting-to the
American student, for in it the author is concerned chiefly with the British
system of colonial administration. The rest of this subdivision, however, dealing
with legal relations, of the state, of its various officers, and of its agencies,
such as departments and local and other public corporations, and particularly
the chapter or lecture on "Citizens' Rights," is of as great interest to us as it
can possibly be to any other part of the world.
"Citizens' rights," ays the author, "constitute the bed rock of modern consti-
tutional forms of government. The, history of the progress of constitutionalism
may, from one point of view, be regarded as the history of the growth of
citizens' rights."
That such rights are by no means the same thing in a modern constitutional
government as citizens' rights were in ancient or mediaeval communities is
brought out in the dearest possible lines. The modern conception he traces
from Magna Carta, through the various bills of rights, down. to the American
Declaration of Independence. A distinction is noted between citizens' rights in
England as represented in Lord Coke's Second Institute, and those in America.
The omnipotence of Parliament is contrasted with the constitutional limitations
of America; and yet in practice it is doubtful whether Parliament on the whole
has deviated from a constitutional model more than American legislatures have.
And the same remark is true of citizens' rights in other countries. They are
shown to differ much more on paper than they ,do in fact.
'The lecture on citizens' rights paves the way for the discussion of adjective
administrative law, which immediately follows it. After all, the checks on
administrative aggression against the rights of the individual citizen in the
Anglo-American system are adjective in their nature. It is true that this is a
mooted point with reference -to the meaning of "due process of law" in the Fifth
and Fourteenth amendments, but the author, in discussing the subject, clearly
leans to the view that it is essentially a clause having reference to procedure.
In these chapters, the author keeps constantly in mind Professor Dicey's "rule
of law." He can understand Mr. Dicey's alarm when, in commenting on the
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Arlidge Case, ([1915] A. C. i2o) that author says: "Such transfer of authority
[to administrative officers] saps the foundation of that rule of law which has
been for generations a leading feature of the English constitution." Yet, view-
ing as inevitable the expansion of administrative law, he attempts to draw the
line between those cases in which the courts, as such, will interfere with the
administrative and those in which they will not. A few apparently simple prin-
ciples can be laid down. For example, that there will be no interference with
discretion, but that officials are compelled to observe the law; that the President
or Governor of a state may not be coerced, and so on. But the difficulty
encountered here is not only that the line has not yet been clearly drawn by the
courts, but that whatever line has been roughly sketched is subject to change
with almost every case that reaches the Supreme Court of the United States or
the House of Lords.
Looking ahead, he regards the ideal system to be one in which administrative
officials, passing upon quasi-judicial matters, shall sit as a court and be recog-
nized as" such.
"An ideal administrative court (and it is that towards which all administrative
courts are tending in France as in other countries) would be one whose members
may be summarily removed by the executive, and whose orders and judgments
would be capable of immediate executioni, without being subject to review by
any but a judicial authority of the same character.'
The American materials used by the author include all of the best works that
we have on the subject from Wilson's The State and Goodnow's Comparative
Administrative Law down to the latest articles in our law periodicals and the
collections of cases prepared for the study of the subject in our law schools.
His use of our case material and his understanding of American constitutional
law show a sympathy with our institutions which cannot be excelled and is
rarely equalled even in the best American law books. A single illustration will
suffice. Notice particularly the keenness with which he follows the personalities
of our judges, without losing sight of .the continuity of the common law against
which those personalities are mere incidents.
"Finally, in i9o5, came the decision in United States v. JuToy (198 U. S. 253)
also delivered by Holmes, J., (Brewer, J., again dissenting,) in which it was
held that the question whether in fact the person desiring admission was a
citizen or alien was itself for decision by the immigration authorities, and their
decision (in the absence at least of proof of abuse of authority of any kind)
was not reviewable by the court on an application for habeas corpus. The later
decision in Chin Yow v. United States (2o8 U. -S. 8 [i9o8]) delivered by
Holmes, J., (with the concurrence of all the judges including Brewer, J.,)
granting habeas corpus in a case where it appeared that the immigration authori-
ties had not given the complainant a chance of establishing her citizenship, does
not take away from the effect of the decision in United States v. JuToy (x98
U. S. 253). Mr. Justice Holmes, jurist as well as judge, has evidently travelled
a long way from the day in i8gi when he pronounced judgment as a judge of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Miller v. Horton (152 Mass. 45o)."
NATHAN ISAAcs
University of Pittsburgh Law School.
Maritime Law. By Albert Saunders. Second Edition. London, Effingham
Wilson, ig2o. pp. xxxiL, 501.
The title page of this volume contains a statement that the Maritime Law
as therein set forth is "illustrated by the history of a ship from and including the
agreement to build her until she becomes a total loss."
In the preface the author writes:
"Some explanation is also due from me for adopting the narrative form in
relation to such a subject. I have done so for the two-fold reason-
RECENT CASE NOTES
(i) That form enabled me to give a practical view of the law, and
(2) I hope it has enabled me to produce a readable and interesting volume."
It is the belief of the reviewer that the narrative form as used in this volume
does not accomplish either of the results intended by the author. Many theories
of Admiralty Law with regard to the rights and liabilities of owners and
charterers, carriers and shippers, are so intricate that the necessity of keeping
in mind the narrative as well as the statements of law only results in placing
an added burden upon the reader. As an illustration of this: the author brings
the steamship "Malabar" to London with a general cargo. Upon the discharge
of the cargo there many questions arise with reference to demurrage, general
average, cargo damage, etc. The reader follows the "Malabar" to the docks,
becomes lost in a maze of statements of law covering the questions which arise,
and is left high and dry to go back and rejoin the steamship again. It is difficult
to see what practical advantage is actually gained by the use of this form.
There is considerable doubt in the mind of the reviewer whether the question
is presented in an especially practical way by stating in two lines, as is done 
on
page iii, that the steamship "Malabar," after discharging at Hankow, proceeded
to London; and then occupying the next forty pages with a discussion of 
the
rights and liabilities arising in London upon the discharge of 'the ship. The
assumption of a detached state of facts in connection With each legal principle
to be illustrated would bring both the facts and the principle which are 
illus-
trated by them more clearly into the mind of the reader.
A further quotation from the preface instructs the reader as to the main
purpose of the book.
"The-chief aim and object of the book is to instruct students of my own
branch of the profession not only in the law but in the practical application 
of
it to merchant shipping."
The author's style and sentence structure is hardly fitted to the purpose he 
has
in mind. Long involved sentences consisting of clause within clause do a great
deal to mar -the readability of the volume.
Two examples of defective English have been selected at random. 
In
referring to the conveyance of military persons on board ship, the author 
says
on page 334- "It qay be difficult to define the number of military persons 
the
consequence of which may subject the neutral ship to the penalty, but in 
truth the
number alone is an unimportant circumstance in the case on which the 
principle
is built, since a fewer persons of higher quality and character may 
be of more
importance than a much greater number of persons in lower condition."
On page 335-
"The steamer Nigretia was on a voyage from Shanghai to Vladivostock 
with
a cargo of kerosene, only carried two Russian officers, who in assumed 
German
names had -gone abroad at Shanghai as passengers to Vladivostock, 
that was
a Russian naval port."
The author speaks several times in his preface of his desire to produce 
a
practical book. Perhaps one of the best aids to his purpose would 
have been
a clear style in which the facts are lucidly set forth and the principles 
of law
are more .tersely stated. The discussion of questions of law is far 
too obscured
to make the volume a practical aid to ship-owner or merchant.
The defective indexing of the book -makes it impracticable for use in 
law
offices.
The reviewer would not have it inferred from the foregoing criticism 
of
the method and style of the author that the treatise as a whole 
is. entirely
devoid of merit; on the contrary, the book shows abundant evidence 
of the
learning and experience of the author.
GEORGE DE FoanST LoRD
Columbia University Law School.
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